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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to establish the link between the high frequency dynamics of spot exchange rates
and developments in the macroeconomy. To do so, I ￿rst present a theoretical model of exchange-rate
determination that bridges the gap between existing microstructure and traditional models. I then report
empirical evidence that strongly supports the presence of the link between the macroeconomy, order ￿ ow,
and high frequency exchange rate returns implied by the model. In fact, my empirical results indicate that
between 20 and 30 percent of the variance in excess currency returns over one- and two-month horizons
can be linked back to developments in the macroeconomy. This level of explanatory power is an order
of magnitude higher than that found in traditional models ￿even the newly developed monetary models
incorporating central banks reaction functions. Moreover, it provides a straightforward solution to the
exchange-rate disconnect puzzle. Namely, the high frequency behavior of spot exchange rates re￿ ects the
￿ ow of new information reaching dealers concerning the slowly evolving state of the macroeconomy, rather
than the e⁄ects of shocks that drive rapidly changing macroeconomic conditions.
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In the 25 years since Meese and Rogo⁄ published their classic paper, Meese and Rogo⁄ (1983), little
progress has been made in developing models that can consistently and reliably relate the behavior of spot
exchange rates to developments in the macroeconomy at frequencies higher than a year. Indeed, the lack of
empirical success for standard exchange-rate models based on macro variables has given credence to the view
that exchange rates are largely disconnected from macroeconomic fundamentals; a view Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
(2001) call the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle. This is not to say that exchange rates appear disconnected
from everything. In the past decade a new literature has emerged documenting a strong link between spot
rate dynamics and order ￿ ows ￿the transaction ￿ ows arising from trades between counterparties in the
foreign exchange market. In contrast to the empirical literature on standard exchange-rate models, this new
microstructure literature shows that order ￿ ows account for a large fraction of the variability in spot rates
over horizons ranging from a few minutes to a couple of months. For example, Evans and Lyons (2002a
& 2002b) found that order ￿ ows account for between 44 and 78 percent of the daily variation in the spot
exchange rates of major currency pairs. Subsequent research has established that this strong relationship
between order ￿ ows and spot rates holds across di⁄erent currencies, measures of order ￿ ow and trading
mechanisms (see Osler 2008 and Sager and Taylor 2007 for recent surveys).
The contrasting results from the traditional and microstructure literatures have made little impact on
the way researchers formulate exchange-rate models. For example, recent research on monetary models
by Mark (2005), Engel and West (2006) and Engel et al. (2007) stress that short-run movements in spot
rates are primarily determined by changes in expectations, principally expectations concerning the future
course of interest rates controlled by central banks. These models have some empirical success at long
horizons (see below), but they are completely silent on why order ￿ ow appears to be so important at short
horizons. The implicit belief in this line of research seems to be that microstructure factors linking order
￿ ow and exchange rates are unrelated to the macroeconomic factors included in the model. In a similar
vein, microstructure exchange-rate models, such as Evans and Lyons (1999), are silent on the potential links
between the macroeconomy and order ￿ ows. These models focus on the details of currency trading between
di⁄erent market participants rather than the macroeconomic factors that ultimately drive the individual
trades. Consequently, they cannot explain why the link between the macroeconomy and spot rate is only
discernible at long horizons. Nor do they provide any clean implications for how exchange rates respond to
macroeconomic policies. In short, an arm￿ s-length observer of the literature might well conclude that the
apparent disconnect between spot rates and the macroeconomy is matched by the disconnect between the
traditional and microstructure approaches to exchange-rate modelling.
The aim of this paper is to establish the link between the high frequency dynamics of spot exchange
rates and developments in the macroeconomy. To do so, I ￿rst present a theoretical model of exchange-rate
determination that bridges the gap between existing microstructure and traditional models. I then report
empirical evidence that strongly supports the presence of the link between the macroeconomy, order ￿ ow,
and high frequency exchange rate returns implied by the model. In fact, my empirical results indicate that
between 20 and 30 percent of the variance in excess currency returns over one- and two-month horizons
can be linked back to developments in the macroeconomy. This level of explanatory power is an order
of magnitude higher than that found in traditional models ￿even the newly developed monetary models
incorporating central banks reaction functions. For example, Mark (2005) and Engel and West (2006) ￿nd
1that the correlation between the log level of the real exchange rate implied by their models and the actual
rate is approximately 0.3, but this encouraging result does not carry over to changes in log spot rates (i.e.,
depreciation rates). In particular, their results imply that macroeconomic factors account for just one percent
of the variance in the currency depreciation rates at monthly and quarterly horizons.
The empirical success of my micro-based approach rests on three key elements. First, the model recognizes
the fact that spot exchange rates are literally determined as the foreign currency prices quoted by dealers in
the foreign exchange market. Second, only a limited amount of information is available concerning the current
state of the macroeconomy to dealers and other agents when they trade foreign currency. These two elements
allow me to theoretically identify the role order ￿ ow plays in linking spot rates to the macroeconomy. In
particular, the model shows that the order ￿ ow generated by trades between dealers and agents can convey
information to dealers about the current state of the macroeconomy which they then use to revise their
spot exchange rate quotes. Thus, the high frequency behavior of spot exchange rates re￿ ects the ￿ ow of
new information reaching dealers concerning the slowly evolving state of the macroeconomy, rather than the
e⁄ects of shocks that drive rapidly changing macroeconomic conditions.
The third key element is empirical. To test the predictions of the model I need to quantify how dealers￿
views of macroeconomic conditions evolve. This is impossible using standard time series observations on
macroeconomic variables. Instead I use a novel measure; the real-time error associated with estimating the
current value of a macro variable (e.g. GDP) using a subset of information that was available to dealers
at the time. These measures allow me to empirically test whether order ￿ ows actually carry information
to dealers about the macro variable in question. The results from these tests are then used to quantify the
degree to which excess returns embed the macro information conveyed to dealers via order ￿ ow.
The research I report on here builds on ideas developed in a series of papers by Richard Lyons and
myself. In Evans and Lyons (2004) we ￿rst showed how the gap between traditional macro and microstructure
exchange-rate models could be spanned by embedding the microfoundations of currency trading in a standard
two-country DSGE model. This model demonstrated that equilibrium order ￿ ows convey macro information
to dealers, but the information is insu¢ cient to reveal the true state of the macroeconomy. In Evans and
Lyons (2007) we developed the model further to study its implications for the forecasting power of order ￿ ows.
Speci￿cally, we identi￿ed the conditions under which order ￿ ows should have incremental forecasting power
for the future path of macro variables that constitute exchange rate fundamentals; i.e., forecasting power
beyond that provided by spot rates and other public information. This theoretical implication represents an
extension of work by Engel and West (2005) based on traditional exchange-rate models, and receives strong
empirical support in the data. The theoretical model I present here is a version of the model ￿rst developed
in Evans and Lyons (2008b). There we derived and studied the equilibrium behavior of order ￿ ow, spot rates
and the foreign exchange risk premium. Here I estimate the relation between order ￿ ows and macroeconomic
variables in the data. Evans and Lyons (2008b) also di⁄ers from the current paper because its focus is on
the origins of order ￿ ow￿ s signi￿cant forecasting power for future currency returns.
My empirical results also relate to the ￿ndings of several other researchers, notably the work of Froot
and Ramadorai (2005). They examine real exchange rates, excess currency returns, real interest di⁄erentials,
and the transaction ￿ ows of institutional investors across 19 country/currency areas over seven years. Using
variance decompositions from a VAR estimated at the daily frequency with pooled data, they ￿nd that
innovations in transaction ￿ ows predict future changes in real interest di⁄erentials at short but not long
2horizons. In contrast, the order ￿ ow data I use spans the full spectrum of agent-types not just institutional
investors, and comes from USD/EUR transactions ￿the most liquid portion of the market. These facets of
the ￿ ow data prove to be empirically important. My focus also di⁄ers from Froot and Ramadorai insofar
as it concerns the incremental information order ￿ ow conveys to dealers concerning current macroeconomic
conditions (e.g. output and in￿ ation) rather than their potential forecasting power for future interest rates.
My results are also related to recent research on the relation between order ￿ ows and macro data releases.
Evans and Lyons (2005), Berger et al. (2005), Dominguez and Panthaki (2006) and Love and Payne (2007)
all ￿nd that macro data releases have a statistically signi￿cant impact on order ￿ ows, while Evans and Lyons
(2008a) estimate that one-third of the variance in order ￿ ow is attributable to the arrival of macroeconomic
news. These results point to the presence of di⁄ering views among market participants concerning the current
state of the economy and its implications for currency prices.2 My analysis exploits these very features.
Empirical results always come with caveats. However, in light of the historically poor empirical per-
formance of exchange-rate models and the novelty of my results, it is important to be up front about the
caveats that apply here. My empirical ￿ndings are based on estimates of the ￿ ow of information concerning
output, in￿ ation and the money stocks from January 1993 to June 1999, conveyed by the world-wide ￿ ow of
currency orders received by Citibank from end-users, such as corporations, mutual funds and hedge funds.
These facets of my data give rise to two potential concerns. First, while Citibank was the single largest bank
in the USD/EUR market at the time, its end-user ￿ ows represent between 10 and 15 percent of the ￿ ows
received by banks across the entire market. This means that the information conveyed by Citibank￿ s ￿ ows
may not be entirely representative of the market-wide ￿ ow of information that drives spot rates. If this is
the case, my estimates will represent a lower bound on the contribution of macro information ￿ ows to the
variance of excess returns. The second concern relates to the data sample. Clearly, it is possible that order
￿ ows carried much more macro information during this period than at other times. However, in view of
the well-documented empirical robustness of the relationship between spot rates and order ￿ ows over longer
time spans and di⁄erent currencies, there is no premia facie evidence to indicate signi￿cant instability in the
underlying mechanism concerning order ￿ ow￿ s role as a conveyor of information. Ultimately, of course, the
robustness of my results will only be established by further research using longer and broader data samples.
Since the collection of order ￿ ow data is now an on-going process, I hope that my results will serve as a
stimulus for this research.
The remainder of the paper comprises 3 sections. Section 1 presents the theoretical model. Second 2
develops the implications of the model into set of empirically estimable relationships between exchange rates,
order ￿ ows and macro data. I then describe the data and present the empirical results. Section 3 concludes.
2In contrast, if there is unanimous agreement on the implications of a macro data release for the value of foreign currency,
rational dealers will adjust their quotes to fully re￿ect this view. Consequently, there should not be any systematic imbalance
between orders to buy or sell foreign currency at this new spot rate. In short, the common knowledge information in the data
release is immediately re￿ected in the spot rate but has no impact on order ￿ow. For further discussion, see Evans and Lyons
(2008a).
31 The Model
This section presents a micro-based model of exchange rate dynamics that identi￿es the role order ￿ ow plays
in conveying macro information to the foreign exchange market. The model is micro-based in the sense
that it incorporates key features of currency trading models, such as Evans and Lyons (1999 & 2004). In
particular, the spot exchange rate is determined as the foreign currency price quoted by dealers who have
limited information about the current state of the economy. The model also contains elements found in
recent macro exchange-rate models (e.g., Mark 2005, and Engel and West 2006) insofar as dealers recognize
that short-term interest rates are the policy instruments of central banks. Speci￿cally, dealers￿interest rate
expectations incorporate a view on how central banks react to changes in the macroeconomy. The model￿ s
focus is on how dealers use order ￿ ow to draw inferences about the current state of macroeconomy, which in
turn a⁄ect their interest-rate forecasts and their foreign currency quotes.
1.1 Structure
The economy comprises two countries populated by a continuum of risk-averse agents indexed by n 2 [0;1];
and a ￿nite number of risk-averse dealers who act as market-makers in the spot market for foreign currency.
I shall refer to the home and foreign countries as the US and Europe, so the log spot exchange rate, st;
denotes the dollar price of euros. The only other actors in the model are the central banks (i.e. The Federal
Reserve (FED) and the European Central Bank (ECB)), who conduct monetary policy by setting short-term
nominal interest rates.
1.1.1 Dealers
The pattern of actual trading in the foreign exchange market is extremely complex. On the one hand, foreign
exchange dealers quotes prices at which they stand ready to buy or sell foreign currency to agents and other
dealers. On the other, each dealer can initiate trades against other dealers￿quotes, and can submit both
market and limit orders to electronic brokerages. Fortunately, for the task at hand, it is unnecessary to
represent this trading activity in any detail. Instead, it su¢ ces to focus on the price dealers quote at the
start of each trading week. In particular, I assume that log spot price quoted by all dealers at the start of
week t is given by
st = Ed
tst+1 + ^ rt ￿ rt ￿ ￿t; (1)
where Ed
t denotes expectations conditioned on the common information available to all dealers at the start
of week t; ￿d
t: This information set includes rt and ^ rt; which are the one-week dollar and euro interest rates
set by the FED and ECB, respectively. (Hereafter I use hats, "^", to denote European variables.) The last
term on the right, ￿t; is a risk premium that dealers choose to manage risk e¢ ciently. This risk premium is
determined below as a function of dealers￿common information, ￿d
t:
In the currency trading models of Lyons (1997) and Evans and Lyons (1999 & 2004), the spot exchange
rate is determined by the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) quote strategy of a game between the dealers
played over multiple trading rounds. Equation (1) incorporates three features of the PBE quotes in these
trading models: First, each dealer quotes the same price to agents and other dealers. Second, quotes
are common across all dealers. Third, all quotes are a function of common information, ￿d
t: Notice that
4equation (1) does not implicitly restrict all dealers to have the same information. On the contrary, dealers
will generally possess heterogenous information, which they use in forming their optimal trading strategies.
However, insofar as our focus is on the behavior of the spot rate (rather than dealer trading), equation (1)
implies that we can concentrate on dealers￿common information, ￿d
t:
Equation (1) says that the log spot price quoted by all dealers at the start of week t is equal to the
expected payo⁄ from holding foreign currency until the next week, Ed
tst+1 + ^ rt ￿ rt; less a premium, ￿t:
In models of currency trading, the size of this premium is determined by the requirements of e¢ cient risk-
sharing. More speci￿cally, when there is a ￿nite number of risk-averse dealers and a continuum of risk-averse
agents, dealers will choose ￿t to minimize their expected holdings of risky currencies at the end of week t.
To incorporate this risk-sharing implication, I assume that all dealers are located in the US. They therefore
choose ￿t such that their expected holdings of euros at the end of week t equal zero. These holdings are
determined by the history of order ￿ ows from all agents. In particular, let xt+1 denote the aggregate of all
orders from agents for euros received by dealers during week t;3 so It+1 = ￿
P1
i=0 xt+1￿i denotes the euro
holdings of all dealers at the end of week-t trading. E¢ cient risk-sharing requires that dealers chose a value
for ￿t such that Ed
tIt+1 = 0:4 Clearly, this restriction makes ￿t a function of dealers￿common information,
￿d
t. It also accords well with the actual behavior of dealers, who are restricted on the size of their overnight
positions (see, for example, Lyons 1995).
Recent exchange-rate models by Engel and West (2005 & 2006) and Mark (2005) have focused on the
fact that central banks use short-term interest rates rather than monetary aggregates as policy instruments.
In line with this research, I assume that dealers￿interest rate expectations incorporate a view on how central
banks react to changes in the macroeconomy. In particular, I assume that
Ed
t(^ rt+i ￿ rt+i) = (1 + ￿￿)Ed
t (￿^ pt+1+i ￿ ￿pt+1+i) + ￿yEd
t (^ yt+i ￿ yt+i) ￿ ￿"Ed
t"t+i; (2)
for i > 0; where ￿￿;￿y; and ￿" are positive coe¢ cients. Equation (2) says that dealers expect the future
di⁄erential between euro and dollar rates to be higher when; (i) the future di⁄erence between EU and US
in￿ ation, ￿^ pt+1 ￿ ￿pt+1; is higher, (ii) the di⁄erence between the EU and US output gaps, ^ yt ￿ yt; widens,
or (iii) when the real exchange rate, "t ￿ st + ^ pt ￿ pt; depreciates. The ￿rst two terms are consistent with
the widely-accepted view that central banks react to higher domestic in￿ ation and output by raising short-
term interest rates. The third term captures the idea that some central banks can be expected to react to
deviations in the spot rate from its purchasing power parity level (i.e., the real exchange rate, "t); a notion
that ￿nds empirical support in Clarida, Gal, and Gertler (1998).
Equation (2) embodies an assumption about how dealers￿expectations for future interest rates are related
to their expectations concerning macro variables (e.g., in￿ ation and output), rather than an assumption about
whether central banks actually follow particular reaction functions, such as a Taylor-rule. As we shall see,
the actions of central banks directly a⁄ect the spot rate via the current interest rates they set, but it is
3I identify the order ￿ow from week-t trading with a subscript of t + 1 to emphasize the fact that dealers cannot use the
information it conveys until the start of week t + 1:
4This implication of e¢ cient risk-sharing also applies if dealers are distributed in both countries. In this case, It+1 represents
the US dealers￿holding of euros minus the euro value of EU dealers￿dollar holdings at the end of week-t trading. E¢ cient
risk-sharing now requires that the expected value of the foreign currency holdings of all dealers are equalized, i.e. Ed
tIt+1 = 0;
after dealers have had the opportunity to trade with each other. By assuming that all dealers are located in the US, I am
simply abstracting from the need to model intradealer trade.
5dealer￿ s expectations about how future interest rates are related to the macroeconomy that are central to
understanding the role of order ￿ ow as a source of exchange rate dynamics.
Dealers have access to both private and public sources of information. Each dealer receives private
information in the form of the currency orders from the subset of agents that trade with them, and from
the currency orders they receive from other dealers. In currency trading models, the mapping from dealers￿
individual information sets to the common information set for all dealers, ￿d
t, is derived endogenously from
the trading behavior of dealers. I will not consider this complex process here. Instead, I characterize the
evolution of ￿d
t directly under the assumption that a week￿ s worth of trading is su¢ cient to reveal the size
of the aggregate order ￿ ow from agents to all dealers. Thus, all dealers know the aggregate order ￿ ow from
week-t trading, xt+1; by the start of week t + 1:
Dealers receive public information in the form of macro data releases and their observations on short-
term interest rates. To characterize this information ￿ ow, let zt denote a vector of variables that completely
describes the state of the macroeconomy in week t: This vector contains short-term interest rates, rt and
^ rt; prices, pt and ^ pt; the output gaps, yt and ^ yt; and other variables. A subset of these variables, zo
t; are
contemporaneously observable to all dealers and agents. I assume that other elements of zt only become
publicly known via macro data releases with a reporting lag. The presence of the reporting lag is an important
feature of the model and accords with reality. For example, data on US GDP in the ￿rst quarter is only
released by The Bureau of Economic Analysis several weeks into the second quarter, so the reporting lag
for US output can run to more than 16 weeks. Let zm
t = [zm
i;t] denote the vector of macro data releases at
the start of week t; where zm
i;t denotes the data release on variable i; (e.g., GDP). Each release represents an
observation of past macroeconomic activity, so zm
i;t = zi;t￿ki where ki denotes the reporting lag for variable












t g identi￿es the source of the public information ￿ ow, and xt identi￿es the source of the infor-
mation ￿ ow observed by all dealers.
1.1.2 Agents and the Macroeconomy
Since my aim is to examine how the evolution of the macroeconomy is linked to activity in the foreign
exchange market, there is no need to describe every aspect of agents￿behavior. Instead, I focus on their
demand for foreign currency. Speci￿cally, I assume that the demand for euros in week t by agent n 2 [0;1] is
￿n
t = ￿s (En
t ￿st+1 + ^ rt ￿ rt) + hn
t ; (4)
where ￿s > 0 and En
t denotes expectations conditioned on the information available to agent n after observing
the spot rate at the start of week t; ￿n
t : Equation (4) decomposes the demand for euros into two terms.
The ￿rst is the (log) excess return expected by the agent, En
t ￿st+1 + ^ rt ￿ rt; the second is a hedging term,
hn
t ; that represents the in￿ uence of all other factors. This representation of foreign currency demand is very
general. For example, it could be derived from a mean-variance portfolio choice model, or from an OLG
portfolio model such as in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006). In these cases, the hn
t term identi￿es the
6expected returns on other assets and the hedging demand induced by the exposure of the agent￿ s future
income to exchange-rate risk. Alternatively, the representation in (4) could be derived as an approximation
to the optimal currency demand implied by an intertemporal portfolio choice problem, as in Evans and
Hnatkovska (2007). In this case the hn
t term would also incorporate the e⁄ects of variations in the agent￿ s




for some vector ￿z; where zn
t is a vector of variables that describes the microeconomic environment of agent
n: This environment includes observable macro variables, such as interest rates, and the micro data that
in￿ uences all aspects of the agent￿ s behavior. Equation (5) simply states that the agent￿ s hedging demand
for foreign currency depends on his microeconomic environment. The link between this environment and the
state of the macroeconomy is given by
zn




i;t] is a vector of agent-speci￿c shocks with the property that
R 1
0 vn
i;tdn = 0 for all i:
Like dealers, each agent has access to both private and public sources of information. The former comes
from his or her microeconomic environment, zn
t : Each agent also receives public information about the
macroeconomy from macro data releases, the short-term interest rates set by central banks, and from the












for n 2 [0;1]:
All that now remains is to characterize the behavior of the macroeconomy. For this purpose, it su¢ ces
to identify a few elements of the zt vector, and to represent its dynamics in a reduced form. Speci￿cally, I
assume that the interest, in￿ ation, price and output di⁄erentials comprise the ￿rst four elements of zt;
z0
t = [ ^ rt ￿ rt; ￿^ pt ￿ ￿pt; ^ pt ￿ pt; ^ yt ￿ yt; :::; ::: ];
and that the dynamics of zt can be written as
zt = Azt￿1 + But; (8)
for some matrices A and B; where ut is a vector of mean zero serially uncorrelated shocks. Equation
(8) conveniently summarizes the aggregate implications of the optimal decisions of agents with respect
to consumption, saving, investment, and price-setting in a manner consistent with market clearing given
assumptions about productivity, preference shocks, and the conduct of monetary/￿scal policy.
1.2 The Equilibrium Spot Rate
In equilibrium, the spot rate quoted by dealers satis￿es equation (1) subject to the risk-sharing restriction
that identi￿es the risk premium, and dealers￿expectations concerning future interest rates in (2). To derive
7an expression for the equilibrium spot rate, I ￿rst use (1) to write
Ed
tst+1 = Ed
t [^ rt+1 ￿ rt+1 ￿ ￿t+1] + Ed
tst+2:
Substituting for interest rate expectations with (2), and iterating forward assuming that Ed







￿i(ft+i ￿ ￿t+i); (9)
with ￿ ￿ 1=(1 + ￿") < 1; where ft =
￿




￿ )(pt ￿ ^ pt): Equation (9)
identi￿es dealers￿expectations for next week￿ s spot rate in terms of their forecasts for macro fundamentals,
ft; and the risk premium, ￿t: Combining (9) with (1) gives the following equation for the equilibrium spot
rate:









The three terms on the right of equation (10) identify di⁄erent factors a⁄ecting the log spot rate dealers
quote at the start of week t: First, the current stance of monetary policy in the US and EU a⁄ects dealers￿
quotes via the interest di⁄erential, ^ rt ￿ rt; because it directly contributes to the payo⁄ from holding euros
until week t+1: Second, dealers are concerned with the future course of macro fundamentals, ft: This term
embodies dealers￿expectations of how central banks will react to macroeconomic conditions when setting
future interest rates. The third factor arises from risk-sharing between dealers and agents as represented by
the present and expected future values of the risk premium. This risk-sharing implication is not found in
standard exchange-rate models, and so requires some further explanation.
Recall that dealers choose the risk premium so that Ed
tIt+1 = 0 where It+1 = It ￿ xt+1: Now market
clearing requires that the aggregate order ￿ ow received by dealers during week-t trading must equal the
aggregate change in the demand for euros across all agents: xt+1 = ￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 where ￿t =
R 1
0 ￿n
t dn is the
aggregate demand for euros. These two conditions jointly imply that It+1 + ￿t = It + ￿t￿1 = I1 + ￿0: For
clarity, I normalize I1 + ￿0 to equal zero, so e¢ cient risk-sharing requires that 0 = Ed
t￿t: Combining this














t st+1dn is the average of
agents￿forecasts for next week￿ s spot rate. Since Ed


















t+1 ￿ st+1 ￿ E
n
t st+1:
Equation (12) shows that dealers￿choice for the risk premium depends on their estimates of: (i) the
aggregate hedging demand for euros, Ed
tht; and (ii) the average error agents make when forecasting next
8week￿ s spot rate, se
t+1. Intuitively, dealers lower the risk premium when they anticipate a rise in the aggregate
hedging demand for euros because the implied fall in the excess return agents expect will o⁄set their desire to
accumulate larger euro holdings. Dealers also reduce the risk premium to o⁄set agents￿desire to accumulate
larger euro holdings when they are viewed as being too optimistic (on average) about the future spot rate;





Combining (10) with (12) gives us the following micro-based exchange rate equation:
















Two aspects of equation (13) di⁄erentiate the exchange-rate implications of this model from those of tradi-
tional macro models. First, the equation identi￿es the foreign currency price all dealers quote. As such, st
is a function of the information available to dealers, ￿d
t; at the time they quote prices. This information set
includes contemporaneous interest rates, ^ rt and rt; but not observations on the other variables that comprise
the current state of the macroeconomy. Second, dealers￿quotes include a risk premium that incorporates
their estimates of aggregate hedging demand and agents￿forecast errors. These factors can be a source of
variation in spot rates when dealers￿views of current and future monetary policy remain unchanged.5
1.3 Equilibrium Dynamics
The dynamic implications of the model di⁄er from those found in macro exchange-rate models. I now develop
these implications to explain the role order ￿ ow plays in conveying macro information to the foreign exchange
market.
Consider the implications of (13) for the behavior of log excess returns: ert+1 ￿ ￿st+1+^ rt￿rt: Equation
(1) implies that ert+1 = ￿t + st+1 ￿ Ed
tst+1; so substituting for the risk premium with (12) and dealers￿
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i=2 ￿i￿1(ft+i + 1






Equation (14) relates excess returns to dealers￿information. The ￿rst term on the right identi￿es the risk
premium, ￿t; as a function of dealers￿common information at the start of week t; ￿d
t: The remaining terms
depend on the ￿ ow of information reaching all dealers between the start of weeks t and t+1: This information
￿ ow comprises observations on current macro variables, zo
t+1 (e.g. ^ rt+1 ￿ rt+1); data releases on past macro
variables, zm
t+1; and order ￿ ow from week￿t trading, xt+1: Equation (14) says that they a⁄ect the excess
5The presence of the last term in equation (13) is reminiscent of the rational expectations exchange rate models developed
by Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006 & 2008). In those models, the market clearing spot rate depends on current fundamentals
and higher-order expectations concerning future macro fundamentals. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2008) show that the latter
can be written in terms of the average expectation of future average forecast errors. Here it is dealers￿expectations of the
agents￿average forecast errors that a⁄ect the spot rate via their implications for e¢ cient risk-sharing.
9returns insofar as they convey new information on current monetary policy, ^ rt+1￿rt+1; future fundamentals
and hedging demand, ￿t+1; and the future forecasts errors of agents, !t+1:
To study the relation between the sources and uses of dealers￿information, it proves useful to rewrite
(14) in terms of the vector of macro variables, zt; and their dynamics in (8). Speci￿cally, let the vectors ￿r
and ￿f select the elements in ^ rt ￿ rt and ft from zt;(i.e., ^ rt ￿ rt = ￿rzt and ft = ￿fzt): Equation (14) can
now be rewritten as
ert+1 = ￿t ￿ !t+1 + ￿(Ed
t+1 ￿ Ed
t)zt+1; (15)
where ￿ = ￿r + (￿fA + 1
￿￿s￿z)￿(I ￿ ￿A)￿1: Dealers use the ￿ ow of information between the start of weeks
t and t + 1 to revise their estimates about: (i) the future forecast errors of agents, !t+1; and (ii) the state
of the macroeconomy in week t + 1; (Ed
t+1 ￿ Ed
t)zt+1: In the former case, dealers only use the information
contained in order ￿ ow. The reason is that the average forecast error, se
t+i ￿ st+i ￿ E
n
t+i￿1st+i for i ￿ 1;
cannot be correlated with week￿t public information (i.e., elements of ￿t = \n￿n
t ): This means that dealers￿
expectations, Ed
tse
t+i; can only di⁄er from zero insofar as ￿d
t contains relevant non-public information. As a
consequence, any revisions in dealers expectations, (Ed
t+1 ￿Ed
t)se
t+i; must be a function of unexpected order
￿ ow from week￿t trading, xt+1 ￿ Ed
txt+1; because this is the only source of non-public information ￿ ow
available to all dealers.
The ￿ ows of both public and non-public information can contribute to the last term in (15); the revision in
dealers estimates concerning the macroeconomy, (Ed
t+1￿Ed




denote the vector of observations all dealers receive between the start of weeks t and t + 1: Furthermore,
and without loss of generality, let the zt+1 vector contain the lagged values of the macro variables that are
reported in the data releases together with all the variables that determine agents￿aggregate demand for
euros in weeks t and t￿1, ￿t and ￿t￿1: Using the market clearing condition, xt+1 = ￿t ￿￿t￿1; we can then
write zd
t+1 = Czt+1 for some matrix C:6 Applying the Kalman Filter to this expression and the dynamics of






t+1) = GCBut+1 + GCA(zt ￿ Ed
tzt); (16)
where G = Vd
t(zt+1)C0(CVd
t(zt+1)C0)￿1 is the ￿lter￿ s gain matrix and Vd
t(zt+1) is the covariance of zt+1
conditioned on ￿d
t:
Equation (16) shows that dealers revise their estimates of zt+1 in response to information about current
shocks, ut+1; and the past state of the macroeconomy, zt￿Ed
tzt: The former is conveyed by dealers￿observa-
tions on contemporaneous variables, such as the interest rates set by central banks. Equation (15) identi￿es
the e⁄ect of such shocks on the spot rate as ￿GCBut+1: It is through this channel that unexpected macro
developments a⁄ect spot rates in macro exchange-rate models.
Macro data releases, zm
t+1; and order ￿ ow, xt+1; contribute to (Ed
t+1 ￿ Ed
t)zt+1 insofar as they convey
6It is important to emphasize that relating dealers￿ observations to the zt+1 vector in this way does not embody any
assumption concerning the dependence of the aggregate demand for euros on speci￿c macro variables. In particular, even if the
equilibrium demand for euros depends on a sub-vector of variables in zt+1 that are uncorrelated with the variables that comprise
fundamentals, ft; it is still possible to write ￿t and ￿t￿1 in terms of zt+1: Evans and Lyons (2008b) derive the equilibrium
expression for ￿t in terms of zt+1 under the assumption that the vector zt becomes known to all dealers and agents with a ￿nite
reporting lag (i.e., zt￿k 2 ￿t and zt￿k 2 ￿d
t for some k < 1): This paper adopts the complementary strategy of empirically
examining the link between agents￿aggregate demands and key macro variables.




t+1 simply picks out an element of zt￿Ed
tzt: (Recall that zt contains the values of macro variables
in week t and earlier.) Order ￿ ow also conveys information about zt ￿ Ed
tzt: Since dealers know the history
of order ￿ ow and ￿t￿1 =
P1
i=0 xt￿i by market clearing, ￿t￿1 2 ￿d
t: Consequently, unexpected order ￿ ow
from week-t trading is xt+1 ￿Ed
txt+1 = (￿t ￿￿t￿1)￿Ed
t(￿t ￿￿t￿1) = ￿t ￿Ed
t￿t: Substituting for ￿t in this
expression using (4), (5), (6) and (12) gives
xt+1 ￿ Ed
txt+1 = ￿z(zt ￿ Ed
tzt) + ￿s(E
n




Thus order ￿ ow contributes new information about zt; via the aggregate hedging demand, ht ￿ Ed
tht =
￿z(zt ￿ Ed
tzt); and about the average of agents￿spot rate forecasts, E
n
t st+1.
Equation (17) provides the key to understanding why order ￿ ow has the potential to convey timely macro
information to dealers. In particular, notice that unexpected order ￿ ow during week t contains information
on agent￿ s aggregate hedging demands, ht = ￿z
R 1
0 zn
t dt; and their spot rate forecasts, E
n
t st+1: Both of these
factors depend on the microeconomic environments agents face in week t: As a consequence, order ￿ ow during
week t carries more timely information about the current state of the economy than is available from the
most recent macro data releases.7
We can now provide a structural interpretation of the relationship between excess returns and order ￿ ow.
Substituting (16) into (15) gives the following expression for excess returns:
ert+1 = ￿t + ￿uut+1 + ￿z(zt ￿ Ed
tzt) ￿ !t+1; (18)
where ￿u = ￿GCB and ￿z = ￿GCA: The ￿rst two terms on the right are uncorrelated with order ￿ ow,
xt+1 ￿ Ed
txt+1; because the risk premium is a function of dealers￿common information, ￿d
t; and ￿uut+1
identi￿es the e⁄ects of public macro shocks that were unanticipated by dealers and agents. In contrast,
order ￿ ow can be correlated with either the third or forth terms. Order ￿ ow will be correlated with the
third term when it provides macro information useful to dealers in revising their forecasts about future
monetary policy and hedging demand, ￿t+1: It will be correlated with the forth term when dealers use
the information in order ￿ ow to revise their estimates of agents￿future forecasts errors. In this case order
￿ ow need not convey any information concerning conventional macroeconomic variables such as output and
in￿ ation. Agents￿forecast errors could be solely a function of private information (i.e. elements in zn
t )
that are completely uncorrelated with conventional macro variables. Equation (17) shows that order ￿ ow
aggregates this information, and so could be useful to dealers in revising their estimates of agents￿future
forecast errors, !t+1:
This micro-based exchange rate model provides a much richer picture of the link between the dynamics
of spot rates and macroeconomic developments than is found in standard models. In particular, because
the model identi￿es the spot rate as the price for foreign currency quoted by dealers, the behavior of excess
returns re￿ ects how dealers change their quote decisions week-by-week. This means that macroeconomic
developments will only be re￿ ected in the dynamics of spot rates insofar as they are observable to dealers
7All macro data realeases, except Civilian Unemployment, contain a reporting lag of more than one week; and even this
exception does not provide complete information on zt:
11in real time, and contain price-relevant information. These are non-trivial requirements but they are largely
ignored in macro exchange-rate models. For example, traditional monetary models and more recent Taylor
rule models assume that all the macro variables determining interest di⁄erentials and the foreign exchange risk
premium are contemporaneously and publicly observed. This assumption is not only counter-factual, but it
also rules out some potentially important channels that link the dynamics of the spot rate to macroeconomic
developments. Speci￿cally, since Ed
tse
t+1 = 0 and zt = Ed
tzt under these circumstances, the last two terms
in equation (18) disappear and ￿t = ￿ 1
￿sht: This means that all the variation in excess returns is driven
by changes in aggregate hedging demand, ht; and shocks to the macroeconomy, ut+1: The exchange-rate
disconnect puzzle (Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ 2001) attests to the lack of empirical success in identifying either ht
or ut+1 with macro variables in the past 25 years of exchange-rate research. In contrast, the dealer-centered
view developed here has the potential to reconnect spot rate dynamics to macroeconomic developments
because order ￿ ow can convey price-relevant macro information to dealers who have limited information
concerning the current state of the economy.
2 Empirical Analysis
This section empirically examines whether order ￿ ow conveys macro information about the current state of
the economy that dealers then incorporate into their spot rate quotes. For this purpose, I ￿rst develop the
implications of the model into a set of empirically estimable relationships between exchange rates, order ￿ ows
and macro data. I then describe the data used to estimate these relationships and the estimation results.
2.1 Identifying the Information Conveyed by Order Flow
Consider the implications of the model for the projection of excess returns on unexpected order ￿ ow:
ert+1 = ￿er(xt+1 ￿ Ed
txt+1) + ￿t+1: (19)







where E[:] denotes unconditional expectations. The portion of excess returns that is uncorrelated with
unexpected order ￿ ow is identi￿ed by the projection error, ￿t+1. Equation (18) implies that the projection


















and ￿zi denote the q elements of the ￿z vector.
We can use equation (20) to evaluate whether order ￿ ows convey macro information to dealers. Suppose,
for example, that order ￿ ow only conveys information on agents￿hedging demands that is uncorrelated with
12the standard macro variables which make up the ￿rst k elements of zt: Under these circumstances, ￿zi = 0 for
i ￿ k; so (20) becomes ￿er =
Pq
i=k+1 ￿zi￿zi ￿ ￿!: Here excess returns are correlated with order ￿ ow, as we
observe in the data, but this observation does not signify the presence of any connection between spot rates
and standard macro variables. Alternatively, suppose that order ￿ ow aggregates dispersed information on
the microeconomic environments agents face that is strongly correlated with the standard macro variables.
Because this information has yet to be made public via macro data releases, ￿zi will di⁄er from zero for
1 ￿ i ￿ k: Under these circumstances, order ￿ ow￿ s role as a conveyor of macro information will contribute
to observed relation between excess returns and order ￿ ow via
Pk
i=1 ￿zi￿zi provided the information is
price-relevant in the sense that the ￿zi coe¢ cients di⁄er from zero.
I empirically examine whether order ￿ ow conveys price-relevant macro information in two steps: First, I
obtain estimates of ￿zi for a set of macro variables, zi: These estimates quantify the extend to which order
￿ ow conveys new information to dealers concerning the current value of zi;t: Second, I estimate the ￿zi
parameters from a regression of excess returns on the estimates of ￿zi(xt+1￿Ed
txt+1) obtained from the ￿rst
step. These estimates quantify whether dealers ￿nd the macro information conveyed by order ￿ ow useful in
revising their spot rate quotes.
Before I implement these steps, two data issues need addressing. Notice that all the projection coe¢ cients,
￿er; ￿! and ￿zi; contain moments involving unanticipated order ￿ ow, xt+1￿Ed
txt+1: It therefore appears that
we need data on both xt+1 and dealers￿information, ￿d
t; in order to estimate ￿zi in the ￿rst step. Fortunately,
another implication of the model makes this unnecessary. Recall that dealers choose the risk premium such
that Ed
t￿t = 0; and xt+1 ￿ Ed
txt+1 = ￿t ￿ Ed
t￿t because ￿t￿1 2 ￿d
t: Combining these expressions with the
market clearing condition, ￿t = ￿t￿1 + xt+1; gives xt+1 ￿ Ed
txt+1 =
P1
i=0 xt+1￿i: Thus, the requirement
of e¢ cient risk-sharing on the dealers choice of risk premium implies that unexpected order ￿ ow can be
identi￿ed from the cumulation of current and past order ￿ ows, ~ xt+1.
The second issue concerns the identi￿cation of zi;t ￿ Ed
tzi;t: Again, we do not have data on dealers￿
information, ￿d
t; so we cannot estimate ￿zi directly from the sample moments involving zi;t ￿ Ed
tzi;t: In
principle we can circumvent this problem by noting that E[~ xt+1Ed
tzi;t] = 0; so ￿zi = E[~ xt+1zi;t]=E[~ x2
t+1].
This suggests that ￿zi could be estimated from a regression of the macro variable, zi;t; on the cumulation
of order ￿ ow, ~ xt+1: Unfortunately, this approach is unlikely to have much statistical power in practice
because the available order ￿ ow data covers six and a half years. This is a long time span from a trading
perspective, but it does not contain many observations on standard macro variables such as output, in￿ ation
and monetary growth across a variety of macroeconomic conditions. Consequently, the available time series
on zi;t are unlikely to be very informative about the information content of order ￿ ow.
To address this issue, I estimate ￿zi using real-time estimation errors for each macro variable constructed
as ez
i;t = zi;t ￿E[zi;tj￿t]; where ￿t is a subset of dealers￿common information, ￿d
t. Combining the de￿nition
of ￿zi with the identity, zi;t ￿ Ed
tzi;t ￿ ez


















because ￿t is a subset of ￿d
t: So estimates of ￿zi can be obtained from the regression of the real-time
estimation errors on the cumulation of order ￿ ow. As we shall see, the real-time estimation errors display
a signi￿cant degree of variability over the data sample. Consequently, their use allows me to examine the
13information conveyed by order ￿ ow with much greater statistical precision than would be possible if we used
standard macro time-series.
2.2 Data
My empirical analysis utilizes order ￿ ows, spot rates and real-time estimation errors for six macro variables
over six and a half years; January 1993 to June 1999. The order ￿ ow data come from transactions between
end-user (i.e. agents) and a large bank, Citibank. These data are disaggregated into six segments: trades
executed between Citibank and non-￿nancial corporations, investors (such as mutual funds and pension
funds), and leveraged traders (such as hedge funds and proprietary traders) in the US; and trades executed
between these same three groups of end-users and Citibank outside the US. Because it is possible for end-
users in any location to trade with Citibank at any of its world-wide o¢ ces, these data do not provide
information on the location of end-users. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the trade location
is correlated with the location of the end-user ￿an inference that appears consistent with the estimation
results reported below. The order ￿ ow data include all the end-user trades with Citibank in the largest spot
market, the USD/EUR market, and the USD/EUR forward market.8 Citibank had the largest share of the
end-user market in these currencies at the time, ranging between 10 and 15 percent. The ￿ ow data measure
in millions of dollars the imbalance between end-user orders to purchase and sell euros.
I examine the joint behavior of excess returns, order ￿ ows and the real-time estimation errors at a weekly
frequency. The weekly timing of the variables is as follows: I take the log spot rate at the start of week t;
st; to be the log of the o⁄er rate (USD/EUR) quoted by Citibank at the end of trading on Friday of week
t ￿ 1 (approximately 17:00 GMT). This is also the point at which I sample the week￿t interest rates from
Datastream. Log excess returns over the ￿-week horizon are computed as er￿





t are the ￿-week rates on euro-deutschmark and euro-dollar deposits. The week-t ￿ ow from segment
j; xj; is computed as the total dollar value of euro purchases minus sales initiated by the segment against
Citibank￿ s quotes between the 17:00 GMT on Friday of week t ￿ 1 and Friday of week t: Positive values for
these order ￿ ows therefore denote net demand for euros by the end-user segment:
Summary statistics for the weekly order ￿ ow data are reported in Table 1. The statistics in panel A
display two noteworthy features. First, the order ￿ ows are large and volatile. Second, they display no
signi￿cant serial correlation. At the weekly frequency, the end-user ￿ ows appear to represent shocks to
the foreign exchange market arriving at Citibank. Panel B reports the cross-correlations between the six
￿ ows. These correlations are generally quite small, ranging from approximately -0.16 to 0.16, but several
are statistically signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. Insofar as these order ￿ ows convey information to dealers,
individual segments should not be view as carrying entirely separate information.
I use the real-time estimation errors for GDP, the CPI, and M1 in the US and Germany to study the
macro information conveyed by order ￿ ow. To understand how these errors are computed, let zi;m(m) denote
the value of a variable zi representing macroeconomic activity during month m; that ends on day m(m).
The value of zi is released after the end of month m and so contains a reporting lag. Reporting lags vary
in length because data is collected on a calendar basis, but releases issued by statistical agencies are not
8Before January 1999, data for the Euro are synthesized from data in the underlying markets against the dollar, using
weights of the underlying currencies in the euro.
14Table 1: Order Flow Summary Statistics
Mean Max Skewness Autocorrelations
Std. Min Kurtosis ￿1 ￿2 ￿4 ￿8
A:
(i) Corporate US -16.774 549.302 -0.696 -0.037 -0.040 0.028 -0.028
108.685 -529.055 9.246 (0.434) (0.608) (0.569) (0.562)
(ii) Corporate Non-US -59.784 634.918 -0.005 0.072 0.089 -0.038 0.103
196.089 -692.419 3.908 (0.223) (0.124) (0.513) (0.091)
(iii) Traders US -4.119 1710.163 0.026 -0.021 0.024 0.126 -0.009
346.296 -2024.275 8.337 (0.735) (0.602) (0.101) (0.897)
(iv) Traders Non-US 11.187 972.106 0.392 -0.098 0.024 0.015 0.083
183.36 -629.139 5.86 (0.072) (0.660) (0.747) (0.140)
(v) Investors US 19.442 535.320 -1.079 0.096 -0.024 -0.030 -0.016
146.627 -874.15 11.226 (0.085) (0.568) (0.536) (0.690)
(vi) Investors Non-US 15.85 1881.284 0.931 0.061 0.107 -0.030 -0.014
273.406 -718.895 9.253 (0.182) (0.041) (0.550) (0.825)
B: Cross-Correlations Corporate Hedge Investor
US Non-US US Non-US US Non-US
(i) Corporate US
(ii) Corporate Non-US -0.084
(iii) Traders US 0.125￿ -0.136￿
(iv) Traders Non-US 0.035 -0.026 0.066
(v) Investors US -0.158￿ 0.035 0.045 0.083
(vi) Investors Non-US -0.029 -0.063 0.159￿ -0.032 0.094
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for order ￿ ows from end-user segments cumulated over a week
at the weekly frequency between January 1993 and June 1999. The last four columns on the right of panel
A report autocorrelations ￿i at lag i and p-values for the null that ￿i = 0 in parentheses. Statistical
signi￿cance at the 5% level is denoted by ￿.
made on holidays and weekends. (For quarterly series, such as GDP, reporting lags can be as long as several
months.) The real-time estimation error for zi on day d in month m is the di⁄erence between zi;m(m) and
its estimated value based on a subset of dealers￿common information on day d; ￿d: Formally, the real-time
estimation error of a monthly series zi is
zi;m(m) ￿ E[zi;m(m)j￿d] for m(m ￿ 1) < d ￿ m(m): (21)
In the case of a quarterly series like GDP, the real-time estimation error on day d is
zi;q(i) ￿ E[zi;q(i)j￿d] for q(q ￿ 1) < d ￿ q(q); (22)
where q(q) denotes the last day of quarter q: I examine the macro information conveyed by order ￿ ow using
the real-time estimation errors at the start of week t, computed from a subset of the information available
to dealers at the end of Friday trading in week t￿1: For the US variables, the information set, ￿d; includes
the 3 quarterly releases on US GDP and the monthly releases on 18 other US macro variables. The real-
15time estimation errors for German variables are computed using a speci￿cation for ￿d that includes the 3
quarterly release on German GDP and the monthly releases on 8 German macro variables.9 All series come
from a database maintained by Money Market News Services (M.M.S.) that contains details of each data
release. The real-time errors are computed with the method developed in Evans (2005).
Summary statistics for the real-time estimation errors, measured in percentage terms, are reported in
Table 2. Two features stand out in Panel A. First, the real-time errors are highly variable, except in
the case of the US CPI. This re￿ ects the fact that the real-time estimates, E[zi;m(m)j￿d] and E[zi;q(i)j￿d];
vary signi￿cantly from week to week with the ￿ ow of macro data releases. The second feature concerns
the autocorrelations. These are large, positive and highly statistically signi￿cant over horizons of one to
eight weeks. This feature arises because the macro data releases used to construct the real-time estimates
contain signi￿cant reporting lags. As a consequence, it takes several weeks before these releases reveal precise
information about the macro variable under consideration.
To see this more clearly, consider the autocovariance for the real-time estimation error with a k-week lag:
CV(ez
i;t;ez
i;t￿k): By de￿nition, ez
i;t ￿ ez
i;t￿k + (￿kzi;t ￿ E[￿kzi;tj￿t]) ￿(E[zi;t￿kj￿t] ￿E[zi;t￿kj￿t￿k]); so we




i;t￿k) + CV(￿kzi;t ￿ E[￿kzi;tj￿t];ez
i;t￿k) ￿ CV(E[zi;t￿kj￿t] ￿ E[zi;t￿kj￿t￿k];ez
i;t￿k):
When k is small, the second and third terms are close to zero because there is little change in zi;t and the
data releases between weeks t ￿ k and t only contain a small amount of incremental information concerning
zi;t￿k: Consequently, the autocorrelations, ￿k ￿ CV(ez
i;t;ez
i;t￿k)=V(ez
i;t￿k); will be close to one. As k rises,
the sequence of data releases between weeks t ￿ k and t becomes more informative so that E[zi;t￿kj￿t]
approaches zi;t￿k: In fact when k reaches the reporting lag for variable i; E[zi;t￿kj￿t] = zi;t￿k; so ￿k equals
zero.10 In sum, therefore, the autocorrelation patterns in Panel A of Table 2 re￿ ect the relatively slow pace
at which precise information concerning the underlying macro variable becomes available from the ￿ ow of
data releases.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the cross-correlations between the real-time estimation errors for the six macro
variables. As the table shows, the correlations are larger (in absolute value) between the US variables than
between the German variables, but are all well below one. This feature of the data will allow me to examine
whether order ￿ ows convey information on some macro variables rather than others.
One potential concern with the use of the real-time errors is that they utilize estimates of E[zi;m(m)j￿d]
and E[zi;q(i)j￿d] that are each constructed from a statistical model. If the models do a poor job of identifying
these conditional expectations, the statistical power of the two-step procedure will be reduced. To alley this
9The real-time estimates for US variables use data releases on: quarterly GDP, Nonfarm Payroll, Employment, Retail Sales,
Industrial Production, Capacity Utilization, Personal Income, Consumer Credit, Personal Consumption Expenditures, New
Home Sales, Durable Goods Orders, Construction Spending, Factory Orders, Business Inventories, the Government Budget
De￿cit, the Trade Balance, NAPM index, Housing Starts, the Index of Leading Indicators, Consumer Prices and M1. The real-
time estimates for German variables use data releases on GDP, Employment, Retail Sales, Industrial Production, Manufacturing
Output, Manufacturing Orders, the Trade Balance, Consumer Prices and M1.




i;t￿k) + CV(zi;t ￿ E[zi;tj￿t];ez
i;t￿k) ￿ CV(zi;t￿k ￿ E[zi;t￿kj￿t￿k];ez
i;t￿k):
Clearly, the ￿rst and last term cancel, while the second equals zero because ez
i;t￿k 2 ￿t:
16Table 2: Summary Statistics: Real-Time Estimation Errors
Mean Max Skewness Autocorrelations
Std. Min Kurtosis ￿1 ￿2 ￿4 ￿8
A:
(i) US GDP 0.165 3.166 0.133 0.903 0.807 0.616 0.372
1.341 -3.637 2.566
(ii) US CPI -0.064 0.379 0.265 0.749 0.528 0.528 0.520
0.125 -0.369 3.196
(iii) US M1 0.292 14.349 0.037 0.495 0.103 0.171 0.112
3.921 -11.495 3.753
(iv) German GDP -1.255 8.406 0.001 0.922 0.843 0.701 0.387
3.295 -11.742 4.412
(v) German CPI 1.871 15.026 0.127 0.935 0.862 0.752 0.660
5.536 -12.906 2.934
(vi) German M1 -3.694 8.363 -1.288 0.795 0.585 0.393 0.237
5.567 -29.020 7.284
B: Cross-Correlations
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
(i) US GDP
(ii) US CPI -0.417￿
(iii) US M1 0.239￿ -0.120￿
(iv) German GDP 0.100 -0.024 0.043
(v) German CPI -0.093 -0.109 0.043 0.105
(vi) German M1 -0.098 -0.004 0.092 -0.049 -0.055
C: Forecast Comparisons M.M.S. Real-Time
Mean M.S.E Mean M.S.E
(i) US GDP 0.729 1.310 0.190 1.407
(ii) US CPI -0.327 1.797 0.054 2.357
(iii) US M1 0.399 11.807 0.033 11.932
(iv) German GDP 0.132 6.981 -0.416 6.954
(v) German CPI -0.136 1.687 -0.035 1.906
(vi) German M1 4.778 42.363 -0.159 20.561
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the real-time estimation errors for US GDP, CPI and M1,
and German GDP, CPI and M1 at the weekly frequency between January 1993 and June 1999. The real-
time errors for the CPI and M1 are computed from (21) and for GDP from (22) using the data releases
listed in footnote xx. The last four columns of Panel A report autocorrelations ￿i at lag i: P-values for
the null that ￿i = 0 are all less than 0.01. Panel C compares the mean and Mean Squared Error (M.S.E.)
of real-time estimates against the real-time errors computed from M.M.S. surveys or professional money
managers. Statistical signi￿cance at the 5% level is denoted by ￿.
concern, Panel C of Table 2 compares the real-time estimates against the errors made by a set of professional
money managers. On the Friday before each scheduled data release, M.M.S. surveys approximately forty
money managers on their estimate for the upcoming release. Under the columns headed M.M.S., Panel C
reports the mean and M.S.E. of the estimation error implied by the median response from the survey. The
17mean and M.S.E of the real-time estimation errors using information, ￿d; available at the time of the survey
are reported under the Real-Time columns. As the table shows, the real-time estimation errors are quite
comparable to the M.M.S. survey errors. This ￿nding provides assurance that the real-time estimation errors
are not dominated by speci￿cation error.
2.3 Empirical Results
I begin by examining the relationship between excess returns and the six end-user order ￿ ows. This analysis
serves three purposes. First, it is now well-established that order ￿ ows computed from interbank transactions
account for a large percentage of the variation in spot rates over horizons ranging from hours to weeks.
However, here I am concerned with order ￿ ow￿ s role as a carrier of macro information over weeks and
months. It is therefore important to quantify the relationship between order ￿ ows and excess returns over
these longer horizons. Second, the order ￿ ow data I use comes from the transactions between end-users and
one large bank rather than all the banks that act as market-makers in the spot USD/EUR market. Since
data on market-wide end-user order ￿ ows is simply unavailable, we cannot directly examine how closely
Citibank￿ s ￿ ows proxy for market-wide order ￿ ow. We can, however, indirectly infer this from the strength
of the relationship between excess returns and Citibank￿ s ￿ ows. The strength of this relationship is also
informative from a third perspective: It provides a benchmark for judging the degree to which spot rates
respond to speci￿c forms of macro information conveyed by order ￿ ow.
Table 3 documents the strength of the order ￿ ow/excess return relationship. Here I present the results of
regressing excess returns between the start of weeks t and t+￿; er￿
t+￿ ￿ st+￿ ￿st + ^ r￿
t ￿r￿
t for ￿ = f1;4;8g;
on a constant, and the order ￿ ows from the six segments between the start of weeks t ￿ 8 and t + ￿.11 The
body of the table reports the OLS coe¢ cients together with asymptotic standard errors (Newey and West
1987) corrected for heteroskedasticity and the presence of serial correlation in the form of an MA(￿ ￿ 1)
process induced by the presence of overlapping forecasts.
The estimation results contain two noteworthy features. First, the coe¢ cients on the individual order
￿ ow segments are quite di⁄erent from each other. Some are positive, some are negative, some are highly
statistically signi￿cant, others are not. In particular, the coe¢ cients on US corporate and both US and
non-US investor ￿ ows appear highly signi￿cant across speci￿cations and horizons. By contrast, none of the
coe¢ cients on non-US corporate ￿ ows are signi￿cant, nor are the coe¢ cients on the hedge fund ￿ ows when
the corporate and investor ￿ ows are also included at the 4 and 8 week horizons.
To place these results in perspective, it is important to remember that: (i) the order ￿ ows are correlated
across user types, and (ii) the estimated regression is not a structural equation for excess returns. The
former observation means that no one regression coe¢ cient summarizes the total impact of a single order
￿ ow on the foreign currency price dealers quote. For example, the negative coe¢ cients on US investor ￿ ows
do not signify that dealers viewed orders to purchase euros by this group as a signal that the euro was
11One week euro-currency rates were unavailable over the entire sample period so the results in Panel A use a proxy for excess
returns using four week rates instead. Re-estimating the regressions in the Panel A with one week rates over the sub-sample
where they are available gives very similar results. The results are also essentially unchanged when I use st+￿ ￿ st as the
regressand and add the interest di⁄erential, r￿
t ￿ ^ r￿
t ; as a regressor. In this case, the estimated coe¢ cients on r￿
t ￿ ^ r￿
t have a
negative sign but are not statistically signi￿cant, while those on the order ￿ows are very similar to the values reported in Table
3. The results are also very similar if the order ￿ows are cumulated starting in weeks t ￿ 12 or t ￿ 4:
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Horizon Corporate Hedge Investor R2 ￿2
US Non-US US Non-US US Non-US (p-value)
A: 1 Week
0.617** -0.069 0.030 10.052
(0.211) (0.087) (0.007)
0.183** -0.019 0.027 8.560
(0.063) (0.131) (0.014)
-0.410** 0.254** 0.052 16.621
(0.165) (0.082) (<0.001)
0.409* -0.020 0.126* -0.117 -0.372** 0.211** 0.081 24.708
(0.221) (0.092) (0.067) (0.133) (0.168) (0.085) (<0.001)
B: 4 Weeks
0.581** -0.038 0.124 21.625
(0.134) (0.053) (<0.001)
0.111** 0.034** 0.054 7.776
(0.042) (0.090) (0.020)
-0.376** 0.234** 0.234 37.088
(0.100) (0.046) (<0.001)
0.384** -0.021 0.051 -0.066 -0.346** 0.203** 0.308 53.832
(0.114) (0.048) (0.037) (0.081) (0.104) (0.045) (<0.001)
C: 8 Weeks
0.485** -0.009 0.195 30.497
(0.093) (0.040) (<0.001)
0.072** 0.014 0.047 4.304
(0.035) (0.074) (0.116)
-0.266** 0.175** 0.310 46.766
(0.083) (0.030) (<0.001)
0.356** -0.007 0.011 -0.044 -0.227** 0.157** 0.419 83.702
(0.088) (0.034) (0.027) (0.058) (0.079) (0.028) (<0.001)
Notes: The table reports coe¢ cients and standard errors from regressions of excess returns between the
start of weeks t and t + ￿; er￿
t+￿ for ￿ = f1;4;8g on a constant (estimates not reported), and order ￿ ows
cumulated from the start of weeks t ￿ 8 and t + ￿. Estimated coe¢ cients on the order ￿ ows are multiplied
by 1000. The right hand column reports ￿2 statistics for the null that all the coe¢ cients on order ￿ ows are
zero. Estimates are calculated at the weekly frequency. The standard errors correct for heteroskedasticity
and the MA(￿ ￿ 1) error process. Statistical signi￿cance at the 5% and 1% level is denoted by * and **.
overvalued. The second observation follows from the fact that we are looking at the end-user ￿ ows received
by a single bank. Currency trading models such as Lyons (1997) and Evans and Lyons (1999) predict that
dealers revise their price quotes in response to aggregate order ￿ ow between dealers, which in turn re￿ ects the
trading strategies of individual dealers that are driven by the end-user ￿ ows they receive at their respective
banks. The micro-based model presented in Section 2 abstracted from this mapping between individual end-
user ￿ ows and aggregate interdealer ￿ ows, but we should not overlook this simpli￿cation when interpreting
the results in Table 3. The coe¢ cients on the individual end-user ￿ ows received by Citibank should be
19statistically signi￿cant insofar as they proxy for the unobserved market-wide order ￿ ow that is driving quote
revision, but the individual parameters do not have any simple structural interpretation.
The second noteworthy feature of the results in Table 3 concerns the strength of the relation between
excess returns and order ￿ ow. The right hand columns of the table show that the order ￿ ows are jointly sig-
ni￿cant at conventional levels in all but one case. Furthermore, the R2 statistics indicate that the proportion
of the variation in excess returns accounted for by all six ￿ ows rises from approximately 8 to 41 percent as
the horizon increases from one to eight weeks. It is instructive to compare this pattern of explanatory power
against other results in the literature. For example, Evans and Lyons (2002a & 2002b) found that aggregate
interdealer order ￿ ows accounted for between 45 and 78 percent of the variation in spot rate returns at the
daily frequency, ￿gures far higher than we see in Table 3. Similarly, in a very large data sample, Berger
et al. (2005) found that the explanatory power of interdealer order ￿ ows is between 40 and 50 percent at
frequencies ranging from a few minutes to a week. When judged against these ￿ndings, the results in Table 3
do not suggest that Citibank￿ s six ￿ ows provide a particularly accurate proxy for aggregate interdealer order
￿ ow at the weekly horizon. By contrast, the explanatory power of the Citibank￿ s ￿ ows at the four and eight
week horizons is somewhat higher than results reported elsewhere using aggregate interdealer order ￿ ow. In
particular, Berger et al. (2005) ￿nd that aggregate order ￿ ow accounts for approximately 20 percent of the
variation in spot rate returns at the one and two-month horizons, whereas Table 3 shows that Citibank￿ s
￿ ows account for between 30 and 40 percent. The point here is not to suggest that Citibank￿ s order ￿ ows are
a perfect proxy for market-wide order ￿ ow, they are surely not. However, the strength of the relationship
between excess returns and the available ￿ ow data is su¢ ciently strong at the four and eight week horizons
to provide useful information about the role order ￿ ow plays in conveying information to the market as a
whole, rather than just to Citibank.
I now turn to the central question: Does order ￿ ow convey new price-relevant information to dealers
concerning the current state of the macroeconomy? To address this question, I ￿rst examine whether the
six end-user ￿ ows convey new macro information. Table 4 reports the results of regressing the real-time
estimation errors for macro variable zi;t at the start of week t; ez






bjxj;t + vt (23)
In these regressions, the end-user ￿ ows are cumulated between the start of weeks t ￿ 8 and either t + 4 or
the week before data on zi;t is released, whichever period is shorter.12
If the Citibank￿ s end-user ￿ ows convey no information about zi;t beyond that contained in current and
past data releases (i.e. the elements of ￿t); the bj coe¢ cients in regression (23) should be close to zero and
insigni￿cant. The body of Table 4 reports OLS estimates of bj together with asymptotic standard errors
corrected for heteroskedasticity. Two features of the results stand out. First, the estimated bj coe¢ cients are
jointly signi￿cant at the one percent level for every macro variable considered. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient on
each end-user ￿ ow is signi￿cant at the one percent level for at least one of the macro variables. By this metric,
12The ￿ows are cumulated between start of weeks t ￿ 8 and t + 4 in the case of the real-time GDP estimation errors because
the reporting lags for GDP are always longer than four weeks. For prices and money the reporting lags are typically two weeks,
so the ￿ows are cumulated between start of weeks t ￿ 8 and t + 2 at the end of each month. There is no quantitative di⁄erence
in the estimation results if all the ￿ows are cumulated between the start of weeks t ￿ 8 and t + 2:
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Real-Time Error Corporate Hedge Investor R2 ￿2
US Non-US US Non-US US Non-US (p-value)
A: US
GDP -0.530** 0.010 0.133** 0.109 0.428** -0.256** 0.197 89.430
(0.137) (0.059) (0.049) (0.098) (0.100) (0.043) (<0.001)
CPI 0.296 0.252** -0.112** -0.153 -0.572** 0.255** 0.157 197.056
(0.181) (0.054) (0.048) (0.098) (0.107) (0.046) (<0.001)
M1 -0.243 -0.090 0.052 0.178* 0.255** -0.242** 0.128 54.024
(0.133) (0.061) (0.042) (0.089) (0.118) (0.051) (<0.001)
B: Germany
GDP 0.106 0.100 0.120** -0.147 -0.092 -0.065 0.029 19.873
(0.175) (0.064) (0.058) (0.093) (0.143) (0.052) (0.003)
CPI -0.380** -0.188** 0.048 0.045 -0.131 -0.068 0.018 33.917
(0.144) (0.049) (0.047) (0.109) (0.106) (0.048) (<0.001)
M1 1.081** 0.146** -0.122** -0.043 0.101 0.182** 0.145 96.927
(0.242) (0.057) (0.055) (0.132) (0.125) (0.048) (<0.001)
C: Di⁄erence
GDP 0.636** 0.090 -0.013 -0.256** -0.520** 0.191** 0.068 59.258
(0.213) (0.092) (0.071) (0.126) (0 .159) (0.060) (<0.001)
CPI -0.676** -0.440** 0.160** 0.198 0.441** -0.324** 0.082 131.419
(0.247) (0.067) (0.069) (0.163) (0.162) (0.078) (<0.001)
M1 1.324** 0.237** -0.174** -0.221 -0.154 0.424** 0.163 149.297
(0.256) (0.077) (0.065) (0.150) (0.158) (0.073) (<0.001)
Notes: The table reports coe¢ cients and standard errors from regression (23). The estimated coe¢ cients on
the order ￿ ows are multiplied by 1000. The right hand column reports ￿2 statistics for the null that all the
coe¢ cients on order ￿ ows are zero. Estimates are calculated at the weekly frequency. The standard errors
correct for heteroskedasticity. Statistical signi￿cance at the 5% and 1% level is denoted by * and **.
every end-user ￿ ow conveys some incremental macro information. The second noteworthy feature concerns
the level of explanatory power. In Panel A, the R2 statistics range from 13 to 20 percent. These results
indicated that the ￿ ows jointly contain an economically signi￿cant amount of incremental information about
the three US macro variables. In the case of the German variables, the picture is more mixed. Panel B shows
that the ￿ ows only account for between two and three percent of the variations in the real-time errors for
GDP and the CPI, but over 14 percent in the case of M1. Insofar as spot rates re￿ ect the di⁄erence between
US and EU monetary policy, order ￿ ows may carry more information about the di⁄erence in macroeconomic
conditions between countries. To investigate this possibility, Panel C reports results for cases where the
di⁄erence between the German and US real-time errors is the regressand in (23). The estimation results lie
somewhere between those for the US and German variables for GDP and the CPI, but in case of M1, the
21R2 statistic is somewhat higher. In sum, it appears that the ￿ ows carry signi￿cant incremental information
on both US GDP and CPI and the di⁄erence between the German and US M1.
The results in Table 4 provide direct empirical evidence in support of the idea that order ￿ ows convey
more timely information about the state of the macroeconomy to dealers than is available from the ￿ ow of
information contained in macro data releases. By construction, the real-time estimation errors are a function
of zi;t and the data releases in ￿t; they are not derived from any ￿nancial data on prices, interest rates or
order ￿ ows. Thus, the results in Table 4 cannot be attributable to a spurious correlation between some
form of measurement error in the real-time estimate and Citibank￿ s order ￿ ows. Further, recall that the
real-time errors are comparable to the errors implied by the M.M.S. survey of professional money managers,
so it is hard to argue that they embody very ine¢ cient estimates, E[zi;tj￿t]: Instead, the rather striking
implication of the results in Table 4 is that Citibank￿ s end-user order ￿ ows carry timely information about
current macroeconomic conditions.13
Is the macro information carried by Citibank￿ s end-user ￿ ows price-relevant? Recall from the model that
dealers revise their spot rate quotes in response to new information on current macroeconomic conditions
insofar as it changes their view about the future course of short-term interest rates and the aggregate hedging
demand for foreign currency. Clearly, information on GDP, the CPI and M1 could qualify on both counts.
What is less clear is whether the macro information available to Citibank is also transmitted to other banks
(either by their own end-user ￿ ows or by Citibank￿ s interdealer trading) in a su¢ ciently transparent form
that it is used to revise the spot rate quotes of dealers across the market.
To address this issue, I estimate regressions of the form
er￿




i;tjxt] + vt+￿; (24)
where ^ E[ez
i;tjxt] is the ￿tted value from regression (23) for a set of k macro variables. If there is su¢ cient
transparency in the spot market for the macro information found in Citibank￿ s ￿ ows to be used by dealers
when revising their spot price quotes, the estimates of ￿i should be signi￿cant. Moreover, if the estimated
projections ^ E[ez
i;tjxt] for the k macro variables well approximate the complete ￿ ow of macro information
dealers use to revise their quotes, movements in ^ E[ez
i;tjxt] should account for the contribution of order ￿ ows
to the variation in excess returns.
Estimation of (24) is complicated by the fact that the regressors, ^ E[ez
i;tjxt]; are themselves estimates,
and so contain sampling variation. To account for this, I replace ^ E[ez
i;tjxt] with the real-time errors, ez
i;t;
and then estimate the ￿i parameters using ^ E[ez
i;tjxt] as instruments for each ez
i;t: This instrumental variable
procedure is akin to 2SLS and provides identical ￿i estimates as OLS. I compute standard errors for the ￿i
parameters from the instrumental variable procedure with the Newey and West (1987) covariance estimator
that allows for the presence of heteroskedasticity and a MA(￿ ￿ 1) error process.
13The results in Table 4 are most closely related to the ￿ndings of Rime, Sarno, and Sojli (2007). These authors consider
regressions of ez
i;t computed from survey estimates for individual data releases, zi; on aggregate interdealer order ￿ow in the
USD/EUR, USD/GBP and USD/JPY markets over a twelve month sample starting in February 2004. They ￿nd that the
coe¢ cients on at least one of the order ￿ows are signi￿cant at the 10 percent level for every US, EU and UK data release they
study. These ￿ndings are consistent with the results in Table 4, but they have less statistical precision because they are based
on a much shorted data sample.
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GDP CPI M1 R2








0.137 -0 .110 -1.140 0.480 1.647 0.690 0.287















Notes: The table reports coe¢ cients and standard errors from regression (24). The estimated coe¢ cients
on the order ￿ ows are multiplied by 1000 and are estimated using the projections E[e
z
i;tj￿t] as instruments
for the real-time errors ez
i;t: Estimates are calculated at the weekly frequency. The standard errors correct
for heteroskedasticity and an MA(￿ ￿ 1) error process. Statistical signi￿cance at the 5% and 1% level is
denoted by * and **.
Panel A of Table 5 shows the results from estimating (24) with excess returns computed over a four
week horizon. The estimates in the ￿rst three rows indicate the order ￿ ows do indeed convey price-relevant
information about GDP, the CPI and M1. The ￿i coe¢ cients for the German CPI, US GDP, CPI and M1 are
all signi￿cant at the one percent level. However, as the forth row of the table shows, the ￿i coe¢ cients are no
longer individually signi￿cant when all six projections are included. Panel B reports estimates of (24) where
the estimated projections of the di⁄erence between the German and US real-time errors replace ^ E[ez
i;tjxt].
Recall from Table 4 that the order ￿ ows have signi￿cant explanatory power for each of these di⁄erences,
and so appear to carry timely information about the cross-country di⁄erences in each macro variable. In
Panel B of Table 5 we see strong evidence that this information is price-relevant. The ￿i coe¢ cients on the
GPD and CPI projections are highly signi￿cant. Moreover, the estimated projections jointly account for
approximately 75 percent of order ￿ ows explanatory power of excess returns: Table 3 showed that the R2
23statistic for the regression of excess returns on the six end-user ￿ ows is 31 percent at the four week horizon,
while the comparable statistic in Panel B of Table 5 is 23 percent.
The results in Panel C are equally striking. Here I report the estimates of the ￿i coe¢ cients for cases
where excess returns are computed over an eight week horizon and projections of the real-time GDP errors
are used as regressors. These projections are computed in the same manner as those shown in Table 4 except
the order ￿ ows are cumulated from week t ￿ 8 to either t+ 8 or the week before the GDP data release. As
the table shows, the estimated ￿i coe¢ cients on the projections for the German and US real-time errors
are highly signi￿cant with opposite signs. Furthermore, the R2 statistic of 32 percent implies that the two
projections account for approximately 75 percent of order ￿ ows explanatory power of excess returns at the
eight week horizon.
The results in Table 5 also point to an interesting pattern between the ￿ ows of macro information on
GDP and the revision of dealers￿spot rate quotes. Throughout the table, the ￿i estimates show that dealers
revise their quotes upwards when the end-user ￿ ows imply that their prior estimates of current German GDP
are too low, and their prior estimates of current US GDP are too high. These ￿ndings map closely into the
structure of the model.14 Recall that dealers expect the future interest di⁄erential between euro and dollar
rates to be higher when their estimates of the di⁄erence between the EU and US output gap widens. So,
if dealers receive new information via order ￿ ow that current US GDP is higher than previously estimated,
they will lower their spot rate quotes in anticipation that the FED will follow a tighter monetary policy that
will lower the future path of the interest di⁄erential between euro and dollar rates. Similarly, if dealers learn
from order ￿ ow that their prior estimates of current German GDP are too low, they will revise their spot
rate quotes upwards in anticipation of tighter monetary policy by the ECB. It is also interesting to note that
the estimated coe¢ cients on the US GDP error projections are three to four times the absolute size of their
counterparts for German GDP. It appears that dealers react more strongly to new information concerning US
GDP than German GDP. This di⁄erence may re￿ ect the fact that the end-user ￿ ows carry more incremental
information concerning US GDP than German GDP, as shown in Table 4. It could also arise because dealers
anticipate that the FED and ECB will react di⁄erently to future macroeconomic conditions.
3 Conclusion
In this paper I have sought to reconnect the high frequency dynamics of spot exchange rates with devel-
opments in the macroeconomy. To do so, I ￿rst presented a new type of exchange-rate model that bridges
the gap between existing microstructure and macro models. It combines the dealer-centered view of spot
rate determination from currency trading models with forecasts for interest rates consistent with their role
as the policy instruments of central banks ￿a feature emphasized in recent macro models. In so doing, I
provide a richer picture of the possible links between spot rates, order ￿ ow and macroeconomic developments
than is found in existing exchange-rate models. In particular, the model shows that order ￿ ow can connect
14Unfortunately, the pattern of estimated coe¢ cients on the projections of the real-time CPI errors do not have a similar
model-based interpretation. The estimates change sign and signi￿cance depending on the speci￿cation. These results may
re￿ect the fact that information concerning current prices has ambiguous implications for dealers￿forecasts of future monetary
policy. The information could lead dealers to revise their forecasts for future in￿ation and the real exchange rate ￿factors that
have o⁄setting implications for future monetary policy.
24excess returns with macroeconomic developments if it conveys price-relevant macro information to dealers
who have limited information about the current state of the economy. I then examine this implication em-
pirically using order ￿ ows from six groups of end-users, and the real-time estimation errors for six macro
variables. My results show that the end-user ￿ ows carry a signi￿cant amount of timely information about
current macroeconomic conditions. Furthermore, this information appears price-relevant in the sense that it
is re￿ ected in how dealers revise their spot rate quotes across the market.
Finally, let me o⁄er a wider perspective on my results. While the explanatory power of the projections for
excess returns in Table 5 are very high relative to other models, they account for less than half the variance.
The model therefore falls well short of identifying all the information dealers are using to revise their spot rate
quotes. What could be the nature of this missing information? One possibility is that the microeconomic
environments driving the current demand for foreign currency are correlated with future macroeconomic
conditions. Under these circumstances, order ￿ ow conveys information to dealers about the future course
of interest rates as well as current macro conditions, so the estimated ￿ ows of macro information examined
here understate the true information ￿ ow dealers are using. Incorporating these e⁄ects into an estimable
structural model for the high frequency dynamics for spot rates using order ￿ ows and macro variables should
provide further progress in resolving the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle.
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27A Appendix (Not for Publication)
I provide a brief description of how I computed the real-time estimates of a monthly log series {. Computing
the real-time estimates for a quarterly series like GDP follows analogously and is described in detail by Evans
(2005). Let ￿{d denote the daily increment to the monthly value for {m(￿); where m(￿) is the last day of





as the cumulative daily contribution to {m(￿) in month ￿: Notice that when d = m(￿); the monthly change
in {m(￿); ￿m{m(￿) = g ￿{m(￿): The daily dynamics of g ￿{d are described by
g ￿{d = (1 ￿ Dd) g ￿{d￿1 + ￿{d; (A1)
where Dd is a dummy variable equal to one on the ￿rst day of each month, and zero otherwise. To accom-
modates the presence of variable reporting lags, let ￿m(j){d denote the monthly growth in { ending on day
m(￿ ￿ j) where m(￿) denotes the last day of the most recently completed month and d ￿ m(￿): Monthly
growth in the last (completed) month is given by
￿m(1){d = (1 ￿ Dd)￿m(1){d￿1 + Ddg ￿{d￿1: (A2)
When d is the ￿rst day of a new month, Dd = 1; so ￿m(1){m(￿)+1 = g ￿{m(￿) = ￿m{m(￿): On all other days,
￿m(1){d = ￿m(1){d￿1: To accommodate occasions where the reporting lag is more than a month, I track
monthly growth two months back via the recursion:
￿m(2){d = (1 ￿ Dd)￿m(2){d￿1 + Dd￿m(1)xd￿1: (A3)
Equations (A1), (A2) and (A3) enable me to de￿ne the link between the daily contributions, ￿{d; and
data releases. Suppose the reporting lag for the release on day d is less than one month. Then if d ￿{d is the
released value for the growth in { during the last month on day t;
d ￿{d = ￿m(1){d: (A4)
If the reporting lag is longer than a month (but less than two),
d ￿{d = ￿m(2){d: (A5)
I incorporate the information contained in the monthly data releases on other variables in a similar man-
ner. (Incorporating information from quarterly data releases is more complex, see Evans 2005 for details.)
Speci￿cally, let zi
d denote the value of another series, released on day d, that relates to activity in the last
completed month. I assume that
zi
d = ￿i￿m(1){d + ui
d: (A6)
A1where ui
d is an i.i.d.N(0;￿2
i) shock. In cases where the reporting lag is two months,
zi
d = ￿i￿m(2){d + ui
d: (A7)
It is important to recognize that (A4) - (A7) allow for variations in the reporting lag from data release to
data release.









d is an i.i.d.N(0;￿2
￿) shock.
Finding the real-time estimates of { requires a solution to two related problems. First, there is a pure
inference problem of how to compute E[{m(￿)j￿d] using the signalling equations (A4) - (A7), and the ￿{d
process in (A8), given values for all the parameters in these equations. Second, I need to estimate these
parameters. The Kalman Filtering algorithm provides a solution to both problems. In particular, given a set
of parameter values, the algorithm provides the means to compute the real-time estimates E[{m(￿)j￿d]: The
algorithm also allows me to construct a sample likelihood function from the data series, so that the model￿ s
parameters can be computed by maximum likelihood.
To use the algorithm, I write the model in state space form. For the case where % = 1; the dynamics





















1 ￿ Dd 0 0 1
Dd 1 ￿ Dd 0 0
0 Dd 1 ￿ Dd 0







































Zd = AdZd￿1 + Vd: (A9)
This is the state equation of the state space form.









d({) denotes a dummy variable that takes the value of one when the reporting lag for series {
lies between i ￿ 1 and i months, and zero otherwise. The link between the releases for the other series and








































































Xd = CdZd + Ud: (A12)
This equation links the vector of potential data releases for day d; Xd; to elements of Zd: The vector of actual
data releases for day d; Yd; is related to the vector of potential releases by
Yd = BdXd;
where Bd is a n￿(g + 1) selection matrix that ￿picks out￿the n ￿ 1 data releases for day d: Combining this
expression with (A12) gives me the observation equation:
Yd = BdCdZd + BdUd: (A13)
Equations (A9) and (A13) describe a state space form which can be used to ￿nd real-time estimates of
variable { in two steps. In the ￿rst, I obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the model￿ s parameters.
For this purpose the sample likelihood function is built up recursively by applying the Kalman Filter to
(A9) and (A13). The second step applies the Kalman Filter to (A9) and (A13) to calculate the real-time
estimates of { using the maximum likelihood parameter estimates:
The real-time estimates for US variables use data releases on quarterly GDP and 18 monthly releases:
Nonfarm Payroll, Employment, Retail Sales, Industrial Production, Capacity Utilization, Personal Income,
Consumer Credit, Personal Consumption Expenditures, New Home Sales, Durable Goods Orders, Construc-
tion Spending, Factory Orders, Business Inventories, the Government Budget De￿cit, the Trade Balance,
NAPM index, Housing Starts, the Index of Leading Indicators, Consumer Prices and M1. The real-time
estimates for German variables use data releases on quarterly GDP and 8 monthly releases: Employment,
Retail Sales, Industrial Production, Manufacturing Output, Manufacturing Orders, the Trade Balance, Con-
sumer Prices and M1. I allow for 10 lags in the daily increment process when estimating real-time GDP,
and 7 lags for the other variables. These speci￿cations appear to capture all the time-series variation in the
data. In particular, I am unable to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in the Kalman Filter
innovations evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates for any of our models.
A3